Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), accessed at: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2026/02/from-the-archives-return-to-greenland/
By Gabriele De Fazio
Upon completing the operation in Venezuela, President Trump indicated the next potential targets of the United States (US). After accusing them of having close ties with drug cartels, the governments of Cuba, Mexico and Colombia were ordered to cooperate with Washington on internal policy, or face the same fate as Venezuela and its former president, Nicolas Maduro. The response of the three countries was various: Mexico agreed to cooperate with the fight against cartels, conducting an impressive joint operation with the American armed forces at Guadalajara airport; Colombia began negotiations with Washington, initiating a presidential correspondence aimed at moderating tones and promoting collaboration (especially economic); on the contrary, strong tensions remain with Cuba, which sees its position worsening after hitting a US vessel off its coast.
However, the statement that shocked the world was addressed to Greenland and, consequently, to Denmark, one of NATO’s historic allies and co-founder. The threat – whether real or merely announced – brings to a situation from which it is difficult to turn back, as it represents a rift that future administrations will struggle to bridge. The main point lies in the erosion of allies’ vision and perception of the United States. Even though this is not the first time that the United States has expressed interest in Greenland, tensions between Washington, Copenhagen and Nuuk have never been so high.
The story behind US interest in Greenland
As mentioned above, the United States had attempted to take possession of Greenland in other occasions. The first attempt dates back to 1867, immediately after the purchase of Alaska led by Secretary of State William H. Seward. He himself was the promoter of further territorial acquisitions, all aimed at Danish territories in the Americas – including Greenland and some Caribbean islands – and even Iceland. Seward’s idea was to extend US dominion northwards in order to counterbalance British expansionism in Canada – which in those same years was recognised as a Dominion – extending British rule from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. At best, the encirclement of Canada would have led sooner or later to its annexations, making the United States the unchallenged owners of North America. Moreover, Greenland would have provided new mineral resources, financing the growth of a country that had just emerged from the Civil War. However, Congress rejected Seward’s proposal.
The second attempt dates back to 1910, during the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft. During Roosevelt’s presidency, the US had extended its control to various Caribbean countries, adopting an openly imperialist policy. His successor, President Taft, while continuing with the strict application of the Monroe Doctrine, proposed a series of territorial exchanges involving Germany and Denmark, ultimately bringing Greenland within US control. However, Taft’s plan never took off, as neither Germany nor Denmark showed interest.
Coming to more recent times, the third occasion can be dated to 1946: a year after Nazi Germany’s invasion of Denmark in 1940, the Danish ambassador to Washington reached an agreement with the United States’ government to allow a US military presence on Greenlandic soil, therefore protecting the island and what remained of the Kingdom of Denmark from German aggression. After World War II, the US government offered to buy Greenland (which still hosted US soldiers) from Denmark, but Copenhagen refused. However, the post-Second World War international order did not leave much room for manoeuvre to either side. The beginning of the Cold War meant that the United States would need some form of control over Greenland in order to monitor and intercept any Soviet attacks coming from the Arctic. Yet, unilateral action could not be considered, as it would have entailed negative repercussions on relations between Washington and Copenhagen and with all European countries, later foundational basis of NATO.
Given the situation, in 1951 the United States and Denmark reached an agreement that mirrored the one signed in 1941, allowing the presence of US forces in Greenland and extending political and military cooperation between the two countries in the Arctic. A symbol of this close collaboration was the still-operating Thule Air Base, built in north-west Greenland. During the Cold War, Greenland was integrated into a joint US-Canadian radar system for intercepting ballistic and air attacks, becoming a central element in US security strategy.
Trump’s obsession with Greenland
After the Cold War, Greenland lost much of its strategic value for the United States. Washington’s attention was shifted towards war on terror and the Middle East, as the Arctic was free of direct threats. Many of the US bases were closed or handed to Danish management, as they were considered an unnecessary expense. However, the resumption of Russian activities in the Arctic, the modernisation of the Russian Northern Fleet, and the start of infrastructure development of the Northern Sea Routes have brought the region back to the forefront of the international scene.
It is in this context that the first Trump Administration adopted a highly critical stance towards NATO countries with low military spending, accusing them of exploiting a “free-riding” situation thanks to the United States. With regard to the Arctic, Trump considered unacceptable that the American bases in Greenland had been ceded to Denmark, viewing it as yet another case of European allies enjoying the fruits of US spending without bearing the costs. With the idea of compensating US spending in Greenland, Donald Trump proposed in 2019 to buy the island from Denmark, only to be met with rejection and derision from his Danish counterpart.
With the beginning of the second term, Trump has returned on insisting on the need for the United States to take control of Greenland. According to Trump, Russia and China are ready to occupy the largest Arctic island through hybrid and paramilitary actions, taking control of Greenlandic resources and transforming Greenland into an operational platform to strike the United States in the event of war. According to this narrative, Denmark would be unprepared for such an eventuality and Greenland would be consequently lost from the outset without US intervention. Therefore, for motives of national security, the United States would be authorised to appropriate Greenlandic territory by any means necessary, considering both acquisition and annexation.
Trump’s assertions require an honest analysis. There is a vague threat from Russia and China in the Arctic, but it is greatly exaggerated in Trump’s version. Moreover, rather than a threat, it would be more appropriate to consider it a long-term challenge, like many others that already exist between the United States and China. Starting with Russia, it is absolutely true that Moscow has launched a programme to ream its northern fleet and upgrade infrastructure to support the navy (military and civilian) in Arctic routes. Yet, it should also be noted that the country has already adopted a defensive position in the region a couple of decades ago, reviving the Soviet-era concept of the Northern Bastion. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that Russia is still involved in the draining war in Ukraine, thus having limited spending capacity.
On the other hand, China poses a much subtler challenge: although it is not an Arctic state, Beijing is investing in scientific expeditions, commercial undertakings, and economic initiatives in the region, with the aim of carving out a role for itself in the Arctic and thus becoming a recognised and legitimate player. With regard to Greenland, China has repeatedly attempted to establish a foothold on the island, proposing to modernise and upgrade certain airports or offering to build new harbours to facilitate international traffic, which is intensifying due to the melting of the ice caps. These proposals were rejected by Denmark for fear of infiltration into sensitive structures.
In addition, neither Russia nor China – and nor even the United States – have the technological capabilities to wage an intra-polar invasion war. The atmospheric and climatic conditions in the Arctic are so extreme that they cause equipment and tools to deteriorate prematurely, making any kind of prolonged military operation on the ground extremely complicated.
Therefore, the Sino-Russian threat is much more limited than Trump claims. Even assuming that the US president’s allegations are true, there are a number of considerations that would undermine the underlying logic. The first consideration concerns the 1951 Agreement between the United States and Denmark: the agreement has never been revoked and is still valid today. The US withdrawal at the end of the Cold War did not take place at Denmark’s request, but because of the United States’ need to focus on other regions of the world. For this reason, even assuming that the perceived risk by Trump is real, a bilateral agreement between the United States and Denmark – and the approval of the devolved Greenlandic authorities) – would be sufficient to allow the deployment of new US forces and technologies in Greenland.
For the sake of speculation, let us assume that the only way to stop a hypothetical Sino-Russian invasion of Greenland is indeed to cede the island to the United States. Even assuming that the island becomes US property overnight, this would not be sufficient to guarantee Greenland the protection that Trump claims he wants to provide. Equipment, units, weapon systems, ammunition, and armaments would not be ready to defend the territory for a couple of years, while it is esteemed that organised and structured territorial defence would require at least 10 years of investments, expenditures, and continuous training. If the threat denounced by Trump were really as imminent as he says, the United States would certainly not have all this time to prepare to defend the island.
The transatlantic schism
The timing remains one of the most interesting aspects of what has been called the “Greenlandic diplomatic crisis”. In fact, Trump’s declaration to annex Greenland by any means necessary, came just a week after the intervention in Venezuela and the kidnapping of Maduro. This shows that the US president was not sufficiently convinced to resorting on military operations against the territory of an allied country, but rather on leveraging the shock generated by the action in Venezuela to place his European counterpart in a subordinate position and bend him to accept an agreement – presumably economic or military – perceived as more favourable to the US administration than the current status quo.
One of the unwritten rules of international relations is that political vacuums never remain unfilled for long. In this case, the rift opened by Trump in transatlantic relations opens up new opportunities for other players, forcing European allies to take note of the United States’ overbearing behaviour and adopt countermeasures. From this perspective, it was immediately apparent that the countries of the European Union (EU) took Denmark’s side without hesitation – regardless of their political leaning – by rallying around the European flag and defending the sovereignty of Copenhagen and Nuuk. In doing so, Trump achieved a slight change in the status quo that he wanted to change, but instead saw his European counterpart harden its position.
Even more interesting are the reaction of the countries that do not belong to the European Union: Canada, also threatened with annexation as the 51st state, has declared that in the event of conflict it would side with Greenland and its European allies, announcing the start of a new economic collaboration with China and floating the idea of a stronger partnership with the EU. Greenland, on the other hand, has openly asked for protection to Denmark and the rest of the European countries, rejecting any form of US appropriation – whether agreed or violent – and reaffirming its ties with Copenhagen. To a certain extent, Trump’s adventurism has even managed to appease the independence movement in Nuuk. Finally, Iceland has announced that it will consider organising a referendum on joining the European Union, seeking protection from EU countries after being threatened with annexation – albeit due to some typos involving Greenland – during Trump’s speech at the Davos forum.
Although there has been little talk since then, the divergence between the two sides of the North Atlantic remains due to the crisis of confidence that has inevitably arisen. The EU has not initiated any internal reorganisation process to respond to US bullying, embarking on a path towards much-discussed strategic autonomy and therefore missing another historic opportunity. However, this has demonstrated once again that European solidarity emerges during crises. On a practical level, it has served to rekindle public opinion of the continent in favour of a common European army independent of Washington’s agenda. The symbolic deployment of a few hundred soldiers from some European countries has shown the United States that the European Union – and the United Kingdom – is not prepared to bow down to violent actions against its member states. Nevertheless, a symbolic act and a firm stance are not enough in the long term, and decisions with profound repercussions on the organisations and structure of Europe must follow.